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The Determinants of
Revenue Performance
Roy BahI and Jorge Martinez- Vazquez

P

roperty taxation in developing countries is a fiscal paradox. On the one
hand, it seems to he everyone's candidate for the primary source of local
government revenue. On the other hand, the property tax is little used
in developing countries. In this chapter, we ask about the determinants of
this gap between expectations and reality, and speculate about what this
means for the future.

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR ADVOCACY?

The a priori case for heavier use of the property tax at the subnational level
in developing and transitional countries is a strong one. There is much to
recommend a greater reliance on this revenue source.1
Correspondence
The property tax has the desirable feature that much of the tax burden is
likely borne by residents in the jurisdiction where the services financed by
property taxes are provided. This property of correspondence between ex
penditure benefits and tax burdens is an important characteristic of a good
local tax. In this case the local governments who levy the tax are more likely

' For discussions of the case, see Bahl and Linn (1992) and Bird (2004).
35
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to be fiscally responsible, that is, to be less likely to overspend on the expec
tation that tax exporting would allow them to pass some of the tax burden
to the residents of other jurisdictions. Only a few other taxes, such as taxes
on motor vehicle use, payroll taxes, and user charges, possess this important
characteristic.
The reality of correspondence advantage of the property tax might be
challenged. To the extent that the property tax is concentrated on nonresi
dential property, and if improvements (versus land) are a significant com
ponent of the tax base, there is a greater potential for exporting the burden
to other regions. This happens when businesses sell outside the region and
are able to pass the taxes on to consumers, when landlords are absentee
owners, and so on. In countries where only industrial-commercial proper
ties are taxed, the potential for exporting the property tax burden is greater,
and the property tax is a less suitable local government levy.
The Benefit Argument
A second reason why the property tax is a good match for local govern
ments is that it might be seen as a quasicharge for services provided. Busi
nesses and some residential owners may perceive that they benefit from cer
tain public investments approximately in proportion to the value of their
properties. For example, property values may be higher, other things being
equal, in areas where street lighting is functional, policing is better, schools
are of higher quality, and so on. It follows that there is a sense in which
property taxes paid roughly correspond to benefits received. This of course
assumes that property is correctly valued to reflect the betterment associ
ated with public investments and regularly provided public services, that
valuations are regularly updated, that land markets function, and that bene
fiting properties are not routinely exempted through the political process. It
also assumes that property owners/taxpayers believe that this link between
tax base and benefits received is more or less accurate.
Revenue Potential and Stability
A major constraint to successful decentralization is the absence of a strong
independent revenue source for local governments—one that is revenue
productive and one that the higher level governments are willing to turn
over to local governments. The property tax can fit this bill.
Certainly, the property tax has the potential to be a significant revenue
producer for subnational governments. In the case of Canada and the
United States, property tax revenues reach up to 3 percent to 4 percent of
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gross domestic product (GDP). The value of land and improvements consti
tutes a broad base that is growing in virtually all countries, and even a mod
est statutory tax rate can yield a very significant amount of revenue.2 How
ever, the realization of large amounts of revenue requires a willingness to
impose the property tax at higher levels than now exist, plus it requires a
good valuation system and a high rate of compliance, which implies a strong
program of enforcement. As we discuss later, industrialized countries have
realized this revenue potential to a much greater extent than have develop
ing and transitional countries, mostly because of their valuation and en
forcement systems, but also because of the extent to which they have com
mitted to fiscal decentralization.
Another positive feature of property taxation as a revenue source, and
one that makes it especially attractive for subnational governments, is the
relative stability of its tax base. Fluctuations in prices, income, and employ
ment tend to have a much bigger impact on tax bases such as payrolls, prof
its, and sales than they have on property values. And the fluctuation in tax
able property values is even less because revaluations are infrequent and do
not closely follow the business cycle. This is an important consideration for
local governments that often are charged with providing essential services
and have no recourse to deficit financing.
The Politics of Assignment
Central governments resist giving up control over important tax bases to
their local governments. They argue that
• the resource constraints are more sever at the center, especially given the
higher priority services to be delivered;
• subnational governments do not have a comparative advantage in admin
istering these taxes; and
• macroeconomic policy dictates that these revenue sources should be held
to the center.
In most countries the property tax seems to be exempt from these argu
ments. The value of land and improvements is not a tax base that the cen
tral governments covet; hence, they often seem content to leave it to local
2 For

example, Hernando de Soto (2000) estimates that the total value of Africans' informally owned
houses and farmland in 1997 was roughly $1 trillion, or nearly three times sub-Saharan Africa's an
nual GDP. However, much of this tax base in developing countries is subject to informal property
rights, which does not help with the willingness to pay taxes. As reported in The Economist, January
15, 2004, "In Africa ... less than 10% of the continent's land is formally owned, and barely one
African in ten lives in a house with title deeds."
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governments.3 The reasons for this more or less common behavior among
central authorities are far from clear. Although the central authorities may
see the wisdom of assigning this tax to local governments, it also could be
that their lack of interest in the property tax lies in the calculus of central
officials regarding revenue potential versus political cost. Or it could reflect
the central government's view about the complexity of administration and
the low revenue potential of this tax.
Other Advantages
There are other desirable features of the property tax, though they do not
necessarily argue for assignment to local governments.
Vertical Equity
The property tax might also be seen as vertically equitable in developing
and transitional countries. In fact, the property tax can be progressive in de
veloping countries, and therefore can increase the overall vertical equity of
the tax system (Bahl 1998; Bahl and Linn 1992; Sennoga, Sjoquist, and Wal
lace 2006). There are several reasons for this. Property ownership is heavily
concentrated among the wealthy in developing countries, and property
owners are often not reached by the income tax system. The property tax
has the potential of filling the gap. On the basis of the high level of concen
tration of ownership, a tax on the land value base would seem to be the
most progressive. At the other end of the income distribution spectrum,
public housing and low-valued properties are generally not taxed at all,
which also adds to the progressivity of the tax.
However, property taxes in less developed countries can be made regres
sive by exemption policies that target the well-to-do, such as in the case of ex
empting owner-occupied properties. Preferential assessment (or exemption)
of certain commercial or industrial properties may have the same effect. The
distributional effects of the property tax, then, are heavily influenced by the
rate and base structure of the tax, as well as by its administration. These are
factors that government can control, to some extent.
Compliance Costs
The property tax has the advantage that it imposes a relatively low compli
ance cost on taxpayers because taxpayers play a limited role in determining
tax liability, except in the case of appeals. Unlike most other taxes that tend
3 This

is not always the case. For example in China, Indonesia, and Jamaica, the property tax is a cen
tral government levy, even though local governments receive most of the revenue.
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to be self-assessed, such as income tax or value-added tax (VAT), property
taxes are assessed by the tax authorities; therefore, the compliance costs are
largely shifted to the assessing authority and hilling authorities.4
Sometimes compliance costs arise because of harassment of taxpayers hy
corrupt officials who are charged with setting taxable values or with collec
tion. In the case of Bangalore, India, the argument is that the reality of cor
respondence advantage of the property tax might he challenged. To the ex
tent that the property tax is concentrated on nonresidential property, and if
improvements (versus land) are a significant component of the tax base,
there is a greater potential for exporting the burden to other regions. This
happens when businesses sell outside the region and are able to pass their
taxes on to consumers, when property owners are absentee owners, and un
der other conditions. In countries where only industrial-commercial prop
erties are taxed, the potential for exporting the property tax burden is
greater, and the property tax is a less suitable local government levy.
Land Use Efficiency
Finally, a property tax might be thought of as a charge for land that can lead
to significant improvements in the quality of land use. Particularly if land is
taxed according to its location value in urban areas and if assessment is at
its highest and best use, a more rational allocation of land use will occur.
This was the reasoning behind the Chinese adoption of a land use charge.
Here the land value version of property taxation has a particular advantage.
In developing countries, however, the effective rate of taxation is so low that
these incentives are not likely to be effective.

REVENUE PERFORMANCE

Despite the a priori potential, property taxes are far from being a mainstay
of the revenue system in developing and transitional countries. On average,
as shown in table 3.1, property taxes in developing and transitional coun
tries raise less relative to GDP than is the case of countries of the Organisa
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In the early
2000s, property taxes in OECD countries represented 2.12 percent of GDP,
whereas for developing countries this figure was 0.6 percent and for transi
tional countries, 0.68 percent. Averages do lie, and there are significant
outliers in these country groupings, but for the most part, less developed
In many developing and transitional countries, property taxes are assessed by a central authority,
but billed and collected by the local authorities.

4
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TABLE 3.1

Property Tax as Share of GDP (Percent)
1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

OECD countries
(number of countries)

1.24
16

1.31
18

1.44
16

2.12
18

Developing countries
(number of countries)

0.42
20

0.36
27

0.42
23

0.60
29

Transitional countries
(number of countries)

0.34
1

0.59
4

0.54
20

0.68
18

All countries
(number of countries)

0.77
37

0.73
49

0.75
59

1.04
65

Note: The average of 2000s data is retrieved from data for the years 2000 and 2001.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

countries do not approach OECD countries in the intensity of use of the
property tax.
It is interesting that the trend for all three categories of countries has
been slightly upwards since the 1970s (i.e., the revenue-income elasticities
have been positive). However, the gap between the industrialized and the
developing countries has widened.
The data in table 3.1 strongly suggest that reliance on the property tax
comes with economic development (e.g., compare OECD with developing
countries). Some OECD countries make especially heavy use of the prop
erty tax. For example, Canada raises a revenue amount equivalent to about
4 percent of GDP, and the United States raises nearly 3 percent of GDP.
This pattern of variation among countries in the intensity of use of the
property tax is explored later in a more systematic way.
Even though the property tax is not intensively used in the revenue
structures in developing countries, it often contributes significantly to fi
nancing subnational governments. The results presented in table 3.2 for the
percentage of total subnational expenditures financed by property taxes are
particularly interesting. Developing countries may not use the property tax
more intensely than do OECD countries, but they would appear to rely
more heavily on the property tax to finance subnational government expen
ditures. This finding, which will come as a surprise to many, gives a differ
ent perspective about the importance of strengthening the practice of prop
erty taxation in the developing countries. It suggests that a foundation is in
place for the revenue importance of the property tax to be ratcheted up by
assigning more expenditure responsibility to the subnational governments.
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TABLE 3.2

Property Tax as Share of Total Subnational Government
Expenditures (Percent)
1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

9.7
16

9.88
17

13.65
16

12.40
19

Developing countries
(number of countries)

18.65
21

15.97
27

13.49
24

18.37
20

Transitional countries
(number of countries)

3.67
1

4.92
4

7.75
18

9.43
20

All countries
(number of countries)

14.49
38

12.89
48

11.63
58

13.40
59

OECD countries
(number of countries)

Note: The data tor 2000s are for the five years from 2000 to 2004.
Sources: Columns 2 and 3 are based on International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook {GFS), 2002; columns 4 and 5 have been calculated from GFS.

The fact that developing countries finance about 18 percent of subnational
government spending from the property tax is a reflection of relatively
lower subnational government expenditure share in developing countries
and that subnational governments in developing countries generally have
fewer options for local taxes hy comparison with OECD countries. For ex
ample, local government income taxes are a common revenue source at the
subnational level in OECD countries.
The averages shown in tables 3.1 and 3.2 tend to hide considerable lev
els of variation in the use of property taxes within each of the three cate
gories of countries represented there.5 What we will ask later is, besides
the level of economic development, what other external and institutional
factors may help explain variations in the use of property taxes.

WHY SO FEW TAKERS?

There are major drawbacks to the use of property taxes in developing and
transitional countries. Particularly the administrative constraints and how
the tax is actually perceived by taxpayers go a long way toward explaining
the relatively low revenue dependence on this tax by governments in devel
oping countries.
5 See Bird and Slack (2004) and Malme and Youngman (2001) for descriptions of individual country
property taxes.
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Administration Cost
The major problem with the property tax is that it is difficult to administer
and costly if administered well. A high administrative cost and a small rev
enue yield tend to make a good property tax a losing proposition. Moreover,
higher level governments have an interest in keeping the political fallout to
a minimum, and this goal may not be consistent with a well-administered
property tax.
The result of these considerations is that in most developing and transi
tional countries, property taxes are badly administered. As we discuss in a
later section of this chapter, the norm would seem to he that both assess
ment ratios and collection rates in developing countries are very low. This
leads to unfairness in terms of how various categories of taxpayers are
treated, to significant revenue leakage, and to a loss in confidence by tax
payers in their revenue source.
Property taxes cannot be self-assessed; hence, a very high staff cost is im
plied, and a great deal of information and record keeping is required. Signif
icant administrative costs are also associated with collections and appeals.
Compounding the problem, there is a shortage of property assessors in vir
tually all developing countries. Thus, when administrative costs are com
pared with revenue yield, even in the best of circumstances, the property
tax easily can seem a poor financing choice for local governments.
Enforcement
The property tax is difficult to enforce. Elected local officials are often not in
a position to take actions against delinquent taxpayers because they are not
provided with adequate penalties to do so. Moreover, those who are not in
compliance may be leaders in the community, and local politicians may be
hesitant to aggressively enforce penalties.
Potentially effective solutions to penalizing those who are out of compli
ance, such as confiscation of property, may be considered too extreme and
generally are not feasible because of the political fallout. The special attach
ment to land in many developing countries raises the possibility that broadbased acceptance of a more intensively used property tax is not likely. This
problem is much like the problem of collecting user charges for services con
sidered essential (e.g., housing, water, electricity). Ultimately, it becomes an
issue of political will, and very few developing and transitional countries
have been able to exercise that will. However, there are exceptions; for ex
ample, South African local authorities have in the past used the threat of
cutting off electricity for failure to pay the property tax or the utility bill.

THE DETERMINANTS OF REVENUE PERFORMANCE | 43

Taxpayer Attitudes
More generally, a major constraint to increased use of the property tax is its
unpopularity with voters. Per dollar of revenue raised, property taxes may
generate more negative reaction than any other levy does. There are several
reasons for this degree of unpopularity. One is that the tax is levied on (un
realized) accretions to the wealth of an individual or a business, and these
accretions do not necessarily correspond to income received. The holding of
some other forms of property, for example, stocks or other financial assets,
is taxed only upon realization. This creates not only special implementation
problems (e.g., how to treat those living on fixed incomes), but it also cre
ates a general hostility toward this tax.
The unpopularity of the property tax is also a result of the judgmental
approach to assessment that is taken almost everywhere. A proposed in
crease in the tax rate on a base that is determined in uncertain or even
mysterious ways is hound to provoke negative reactions. Finally, the tax is
unpopular because it is so visible. Income tax is subject to withholding,
but even so, most taxpayers may not be able to accurately report their an
nual payment. Consumption taxes are paid in small increments and are of
ten obscured in the final price of the merchandise. Most people could not
even guess at the annual amount of VAT that they may pay. The property
tax, on the other hand, is highly visible. It is usually billed annually or
quarterly, and property owners are much more likely to know exactly
what they pay.
Elasticity
Government officials desire a tax that exhibits an automatic revenue
growth. This protects them from returning regularly to the voters for per
mission to increase the tax rates every time the demand or cost of public ser
vices increases. The property tax is not an income-elastic tax. The basic
problem is that reassessments occur only periodically. In the interim, hence,
year-to-year growth in revenues is mostly due to additions to the tax base
through new construction or subdivisions. Building some revenue growth
into the property tax is no easy matter. Periodic revaluation is the usual ap
proach. But when revaluation is too infrequent, say every five or ten years,
it leads to large one-time increases in tax liability and to voter uproar from
the shock. As a result, countries use various means to cushion the shock,
but these many times end up reducing the effective rate of property tax.
Some innovations introduced internationally to deal with the issue of low
elasticity include indexation used, for example, in Jordan, Colombia, and
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Brazil, and the phasing-in of the reassessed values, as in the Philippines
(Guevara and Yoingco, 1997). Neither of these solutions is flawless.

HOW CAN THE PROPERTY TAX REACH ITS POTENTIAL?

Two routes to increasing property tax revenue mobilization in developing
countries exist. One is a move toward fiscal decentralization as a develop
ment strategy. Even if the property tax share of subnational governments
did not rise beyond the present level of 18 percent of expenditures, in
creased expenditure responsibility for subnational governments will lead to
a higher property tax share of GDP. The second route to an increased rate
of revenue mobilization is improved tax administration.
Fiscal Decentralization
A useful approach to explaining the relative demand for property taxation
in a country is to view this demand as derived from the demand for fiscal
decentralization on the part of the national electorate in that country. A rea
sonable working hypothesis is that countries that seek greater fiscal decen
tralization will spend more through local governments and will rely more
heavily on property taxation to finance these expenditures.
The argument for choosing the property tax is straightforward. Fiscal
decentralization, to be truly effective, requires autonomous subnational
government taxes. The criteria for choosing a good subnational government
tax point to property taxation as a logical choice. Consider the following:
• A good local tax is one where there is a correspondence between the bound
aries within which the expenditure benefits are received and the boundaries
within which the tax burden falls. The property tax comes close to satisfy
ing this condition for both second-tier and third-tier governments.
• Under good administration, and with a commitment to provide important
services, the property tax can be a significant source of revenue for subnational governments. Potentially, the tax base is large and income elastic.
• Subnational governments, particularly third-tier local governments, may
have a comparative advantage in assessing the property tax base because
of their familiarity with the local economy and its land use patterns.
• Higher-level governments are not likely to aggressively compete for the
right to levy property taxation because it is a high cost method of raising
revenue, it is politically unpopular, and because central governments do
not have a comparative advantage in assessing the base.
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We test the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization drives the intensity of
use of the property tax with an empirical analysis. The data are down from
a multicountry panel data set drawn from the Government Finance Statistics
Yearbook (GFS) of the International Monetary Fund and from several other
sources. We measure fiscal decentralization as subnational government
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures. To test the
role of fiscal decentralization on the relative use of property taxation, we
need to control for other variables expected to affect the dependent variable.
In particular, we expect that reliance on property taxation may he higher
across countries and over time the greater the degree of urbanization. Both
land and improvement values tend to increase significantly in value in ur
ban centers, and with this comes a heightened attractiveness of property
taxation. We also control in the regression analysis for GDP per capita be
cause we have seen that for a variety of institutional reasons richer coun
tries tend to make a higher use of property taxation. Transitional countries
are identified by a dummy variable. Even controlling for income per capita
differences, transitional countries present very distinct institutional peculi
arities such as history of land ownership and titling, which may affect the
relative use of property taxation. We also control for population size and the
rate of growth of population.
The estimation is based on a panel of 70 countries for three years, 1990,
1995, and 2000. Although data for many of the variables are available an
nually, the restriction to three years is imposed by the data availability for
the urban population ratio. Besides the International Monetary Fund GFS,
we use data from the World Resource Institute6 for GDP per capita, popu
lation, and population growth rate. The data for urbanization are from the
United Nations.7
Because of the possible nonlinear effects of population and GDP per
capita, these two variables are entered in the regression in logarithms. Given
the cross-country nature of the data set, there are potentially a number of
issues specific to each of those countries for which we cannot control in the
regressions, but may have an impact on the behavior of the dependent vari
able (property taxes relative to GDP). In this case the appropriate approach
may be fixed or random effects estimation. However, because we are re
stricted to three years and because of missing data for some of the variables,
we end up with an unbalanced panel data set with 107 observations. This does
not support a fixed effects estimation approach for 70 different countries.

6 The

World Resource Institute, www.earthtrends.wri.org.
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision" from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat 2004.

7 "The
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Instead, we allow for the presence of time effects by using dummy variables
for 1990 and 1995.
In table 3.3 we present the two-stage least squares (2SLS) results. The
need for using 2SLS arises from the potential endogeneity of the main con
trol variable of interest, the level of fiscal decentralization. It may be that de
centralization not only affects the relative use of property taxation as hy
pothesized here, hut also that, in a reverse causation, the presence or
relative ease of property taxation may also affect the extent of decentraliza
tion. In fact, the Hausman test for endogeneity shows that we cannot reject
the possibility that the decentralization variable is indeed endogenous. For

TABLE 3.3

The Determinants of the Relative Use of Property Taxation
(Dependent Variable: Property Tax Revenues to GDP), 2SLS Estimation
Variables

Coefficient estimate

T-stat

Probability >t

Constant
0.008

0.11

0.909

Ipop

-0.306

-6.04

0.000

p_decent

10.355

4.50

0.000

urbanpct

1.057

-0.11

0.915

57.673

4.83

0.000

0.005

0.02

0.981

dy90

-0.237

-1.23

0.222

dy95

-0.295

-1.61

0.111

Igdpcap

pgr
transition

Number of observations
F (8,99)
Probability >F
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
Root Mean Square Error

107
40.74
0.0000
0.7670
0.7482
0.7336

Notes on variables: Igdpcap = logarithm of GDP per capita; Ipop = logarithm of population; p_decent =
predicted value of decentralization variable from the first stage estimation; urbanpct = percent urban
population; pgr = rate of population growth; transition = dummy of countries in transition; dy90 =dummy
for 1990 (the control year is 2000); dy95 = dummy for 1995 (the control year is 2000).
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TABLE

3.4

Fiscal Decentralization Indicators (Percent)
1970s

1990s-2000s

1980s

Developing

OECD

Developing

countries

countries

OECD
countries

Developing

countries

10.68
(43)

17.91
(24)

8.87
.(33)

18.18
(23)

10.61
I28)

18.39
(21)

22.41
(23)

13.42
(45)

33.68
(23)

12.09
(41)

31.97
(24)

12.97
(54)

32.68
(24)

30.32
(24)

countries

Transitional
OECD
countries countries

Subnational
government
tax as a share
of total
government
tax
Subnational
government
expenditure as
a share of total
government
expenditure
Note: Sample sizes are in parentheses.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

this reason we run as an alternative two-stage least squares, where in the
first stage we use as instruments for decentralization population, popula
tion growth rate, and per capita GDP.
Results from the 2SLS estimation show that the coefficient for fiscal de
centralization is positive and statistically significant. This supports the hy
pothesis that the demand for the use of property taxation is driven by the
level of decentralization. The log of population is negative and significant,
and the growth rate of population is positive and significant.
We may use these findings to help explain the slow growth of the prop
erty tax in developing countries, as reported in table 3.1. Based on the sig
nificant coefficient for decentralization in table 3.3, we can say that, other
things equal, if the decentralization ratio had increased by 5 percent for
developing countries in the 1990s, the ratio of property tax revenue of
GDP would, on average, have been in that decade close to 0.6, or the aver
age level reached in the 2000s by that group of countries. However, as we
show in table 3.4, there has been little growth in the fiscal decentralization
ratio over the past three decades. For developing countries, the level of fis
cal decentralization, measured by subnational government expenditures
as a share of total government expenditure, was about 13 percent, on av
erage, in the 1970s, and was marginally lower in the 1990s and early
2000s.
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TABLE 3.5 Ratio of Third-Tier Government Expenditures to Total Subnational
Government Expenditures, Selected Countries (Percent)
1990s

2000s

OECD countries
(number of countries)

53.91
10 .

46.89
10

Developing countries
(number of countries)

40.97
8

40.63
8

All countries
(number of countries)

47.44
18

29.17
18

Notes: The table excludes countries with 100 percent of subnational expenditures at the local level (that
is, those countries without intermediate regional or provincial governments). The data for 2000s are for
the five years from 2000 to 2004.
Source: International Monetary Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, various years.

With an adjusted R-square of 0.75 for the regression in table 3.3, we
have not explained all of what goes in to determining the intensity of use of
property taxation. One source of this specification error is the failure to
account for differences among countries in the fiscal importance of thirdtier (local) governments. For example, the arguments for property taxation
are that it is a tax most suitable for third-tier local governments, that is, for
city and municipal local governments that are small enough to capture the
advantages of familiarity in setting tax rates that reflect voter preferences
for financing local services and small enough to capture the comparative ad
vantages of familiarity in assessing property. Thus, a reasonable additional
hypothesis would be that the larger the importance of local governments in
the subnational government sector (local plus regional), the higher the in
tensity of use of property taxation.8 Unfortunately, the International Mone
tary Fund's GFS does not always show this breakdown (or shows it on an
inconsistent basis). From the partial evidence in table 3.5, it would seem
like the relative importance of third-tier (local) governments has declined in
the 2000s vis-a-vis the 1990s, at least for the case of developed countries.
Therefore, it is not possible for us to introduce this type of variable in the
regressions in table 3.3.

A corollary of this reasoning is that other taxes, such as personal income or consumption taxes, are
more easily applicable at the regional level so that the larger the importance of the intermediate level
governments in the subnational government sector, the lower the relative use of property taxation
vis-a-vis other taxes.

8
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Improved Administration
As shown in table 3.1, the property tax share of GDP has not increased
significantly over the past 30 years. In the previous section of this chap
ter, we have identified the lack of a deepening of fiscal decentralization as
a constraint. There are other internal institutional constraints, having to
do with how property taxes are actually structured and administered,
that no doubt contribute to the overall lackluster performance of prop
erty taxation. These factors are especially relevant in the developing
world. Data are not available for Us to analyze these internal determi
nants of property tax revenue growth in a regression analysis. However,
we might use a priori reasoning to speculate on the constraints and then
try to illustrate these conjectures with examples and information from
selected countries.
In order to identify some of the elements at play, we use the following
identity, which describes the components or steps that go into identifying
the ratio of property tax revenues to GDP in any particular country.
Tc
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property tax revenue collections
GDP
property tax liability
taxable assessed value
taxable market value
full market value

The term on the left of the identity is the ratio of property tax revenue
collections to GDP. It is the wide variation in this ratio (reported in table
3.1) that we would like to explain. Why do some countries realize a much
higher effective property tax rate than do others? Our focus here is on the
components of the tax structure and its implementation, particularly on as
sessment and collection.
The first term on the right is the collection ratio, that is, the percentage
of true liability that is collected. In developing countries, where enforce
ment is often lax, collection rates as low as 50 percent are normal. Some ex
amples, presented in table 3.6, support this argument.
Even the low rates reported in table 3.6 may be overestimates because in
some cases they include collections of arrears in the numerator, but only
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TABLE 3.6

Selected Measures of Property Tax Administration

Country

Collection rate

Assessment
ratio

Selected exemptions
(partial or total)

Philippines

50-60 percent of

Legal assessment

Assessment ratios

(Rosengard 1998;

current billings in

ratios vary from 15

vary by value class

Guevara 2004)

1990

percent to 80

and by property use

percent
Jamaica
(Sjoquist 2004)

40 percent in 2004

The median

Certain agricultural

assessment ratio

properties

was 11 percent
between the
general revaluations
Chile
(Rosengard 1998)

73 percent in 1990

indonesia

80 percent in 1990

Two-thirds of all
property is exempt

Legal assessment

—

rates of 20 percent

(Rosengard 1998)
Kenya

—

10-60 percent

Actual rates vary
between 20 percent

(Kelly 2004)

and 70 percent
Colombia

80 percent

70 percent in

(Iregui et al. 2004;

Bogota, 85 percent

Bird 2004)

in Medillin

Source: Various works cited in the table.

current year liabilities in the denominator. Moreover, the demand for prop
erty tax payments may be based on a very low assessment ratio.
The second term, the ratio of tax liability to assessed value, describes the
tax rate. The higher the legal tax rates, the higher value of this term. Gov
ernments in all countries face great pressure to keep the nominal rates low
because of the unpopularity of the property tax. A typical range for tax rates
under a capital value system may be between 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent,
but can be much lower. The statutory rate is set to achieve a revenue target,
given the size of the tax base and the assessment ratio.
The third term is the ratio of assessed value to taxable market value.
This term varies with the efficiency of the valuation process. It also is af
fected by discretionary decisions to reduce the taxable base by applying an
assessment ratio that is less than 1:0, for example, in the case of classified
property taxes where industrial and residential properties often are as
signed different assessment ratios. If no discretionary assessment ratio were
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TABLE 3.7

Simulated Impacts of Alternative Property Tax Administration Reform

Vv=

IVrL)

<Tl/AV)

(AWTMV)

(TMV/MV)

(MV/y)

Baseline

0.6

0.5

0.05

0.5

0.8

60

Scenario 1

0.84

0.7

0,05

0.5

0.8

60

Scenario 2

0.9

0.5

0.05

0.75

0.8

60

Scenario 3

0.75

0.5

0.05

0.5

1.0

60

Scenario 4

1.58

0.7

0.05

0.75

1.0

60

Note Bold figures indicate parameter deviations from baseline values.

applied and all properties on the roll were valued at 100 percent of full mar
ket value, this ratio would be 1.0. The overwhelming evidence from devel
oping countries is that properties are dramatically underassessed. In prac
tice, valuation rates can be as low as 20 percent. Some evidence on the
degree of variation in assessment ratios is given in table 3.7. Even these
very low estimates may he an overstatement because they do take into ac
count the fact that many properties are not valued at all.
The ratio of taxable market value to total market value indicates the im
pact of exemptions and preferential treatments on the property tax base, as
well as exclusions. In many countries sizeable exemptions have been pro
vided, depleting the tax base. These range from preferential treatment for
homeowners to property tax holidays for new businesses. Again, some in
dicative evidence is presented in table 3.6. For example, in the case of Chile,
two-thirds of all property is reported to be exempt. Another cause for the di
vergence between taxable market value and total market value is the failure
to discover and incorporate new construction to the tax rolls.
Finally, the ratio of market value of real property to GDP tells us how
property values match up to total output in the economy. For example, in an
urbanized country, one might expect a higher (and growing) ratio of market
value of property to total GDP. Local governments can exert little short-run
control over this component of revenue performance.
What this identity tells us is that the reasons for the poor revenue per
formance of the property tax in developing countries are numerous, but are
largely within the control of the local governments.
The importance of this point can be illustrated with a simple simulation
that identifies the potential revenue impacts of local government adminis
trative reform, as shown in table 3.7. In the columns we show the compo
nents of the property tax identity presented earlier, for example, in column
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1 is the ratio of property tax to GDP, in column 2 is the collection rate, and
so on. The first row of table 3.7 shows the baseline simulation, where the
values of all the parameters are reasonably chosen so that the resulting
property tax effort is 0.6 percent of GDP, the international average for de
veloping countries as reported in table 3.1. The parameters of concern are
the collection rate, the assessment ratio, and the exemption policy, and in
those cases we have chosen values that seem more or less reflective of the
actual practice. Apart from these policy variables, there are two controls
that we do not vary in the simulations. A statutory tax rate of about 0.5
percent seems a reasonable assumption. The ratio of market value to GDP
(which may hold many other factors) is calculated as a residual to satisfy
the identity.
The results of the simple simulation show the following:
• In row 2 we vary only the collection rate from 50 percent to 70 percent.
The result is that the property tax ratio to GDP increases from 0.6 percent
to 0.84 percent, an increase of 40 percent.
• In row 3 we vary only the assessment ratio from 50 percent to 75 percent.
The result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.9, an increase of
nearly 50 percent.
• In row 4 we eliminate exemptions and do not change anything else. The
result is that the property tax share of GDP rises to 0.75, an increase
of about 25 percent.
• In row 5 we vary all three of these factors together and estimate a more
than doubling of the property tax share of GDP.
This simple simulation illustrates well that plausible improvements in
government administrative and design practices can move the property tax to
a much more significant place in the revenue system of developing countries.
Getting property taxes to rise 1 percent of GDP implies a significant jump in
the financing capacity of local governments in many countries around the
world. In table 3.8 we report the results of an additional simple simulation to
illustrate that point. If for the sample of countries in our data set (used to run
the regression reported in table 3.3) we select first those countries that collect
less than 1 percent of GDP in property taxes, and then we allow those coun
tries to collect up to 1 percent of GDP in property taxes, the average increase
in subnational government revenues would be around one-third.
Improvements in the administration parameters are possible and clearly
can be made. But they are not easily made. Even more bothersome is the fact
that big efforts are often put together to improve one of two of the critical pa
rameters just to see the deterioration of other parameters with overall little
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TABLE 3.8

Simulations of Revenue Implications of Property Taxes Representing
1 Percent of GDP, Year 2000 (21 Countries)

Selected countries

Actual property
tax per GDP
(percent)

Percentage revenue
increase of subnational
government by topping
1 percent of GDP

Austria

0.1

4.7

Bulgaria

0.3

9.2

Chile

0.7-

Croatia

0.5

9.2

Czech Republic

0.5

1.4

Estonia

0.5

7.7

Ethiopia

0.2

7.0

Hungary

0.7

2.2

Indonesia

0.1

66.0

Iran

0.2

45.5

Italy

0.9

0.6

Jamaica

0.2

141.9

Lithuania

0.6

6.0

Romania

0.5

11.5

Slovak Republic

0.6

17.8

Slovenia

0.7

3.9

Sri Lanka

0.7

79.9

Swaziland

0.1

130.0

Thailand

0.3

34.5

Uganda

0.1

20.1

Ukraine

0.0

9.2

Mean values

0.4

29.6

13.1
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impact on actual revenue collections. For example, Dillinger (1988) reports
how the Philippines' Property Tax Administration Project was successful in
producing tax maps and updated property assessments, but this effort never
yielded a substantial increase in revenue because the poor collection prac
tices were never addressed. Even though valuations increased by 37.5 per
cent and collectibles by 13.6 percent, actual tax revenues increased by only
1.1 percent. In contrast, as Kelly (1993) reports, the Indonesian reform was
more successful. By focusing on improved collection efficiency and im
proved valuation and assessment, property collection efficiency rose from
65 percent to 79 percent, and the share of property tax revenue in total own
source revenue almost doubled between 1990 and 1991.

THE FUTURE OF THE PROPERTY TAX
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Making property taxes work in developing and transitional countries is a
complex challenge. Although many internal and external factors are in
volved, we speculate that the future of the property tax in these countries
depends mainly on four factors: (1) the efficacy of shortcuts to valuation of
property; (2) technology catch-up; (3) the willingness of the central govern
ments to give local governments access to other productive tax bases; and
(4) the pace of decentralization.
Factor 1: Administrative Shortcuts
Administrative cost is arguably the biggest constraint to the growth of the
property tax. For the revenue it generates, it is just too expensive to prop
erly levy and enforce. So countries are turning increasingly to shortcuts to
address this problem. Introducing notional valuation based on location and
area, self-assessment, indexing between valuation periods, and exempting
properties that are hard to tax are all examples of such shortcuts. Will these
innovations save the property tax or destroy it?
The approach that seems to be gaining currency in developing countries
is area-based assessment. This is both inexpensive to do and understand
able enough to be acceptable to taxpayers. However, at base it requires a
judgmental assessment of value per square meter in each of the valuation
zones prescribed by the regional or local government, and it requires judg
ment in setting the boundaries of the zone. The resulting notional values
will require adjustment each year to build any elasticity into the property
tax, and the zone boundaries may need to be changed periodically. More
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over, the idea that all properties in a zone can be subjected to the same no
tional valuation per area unit will turn out to be an enemy of fairness in
property taxation. Area-based assessments are likely to improve the revenue
yield of the tax and to give a better ratio of administrative cost to collec
tions, but local governments are not likely to move to a higher intensity of
property tax use with this approach to valuation.
Factor 2: Technology
Will technology save property tax administration in developing countries? In
fact, developing countries appear to be closing the technology gap at a much
faster rate than they are closing the income gap. Can new technologies such as
computerized mass appraisal, satellite-aided mapping, and cross-referencing9
circumvent the high costs and time delays associated with the valuation pro
cess? Will it soon be possible for local governments to keep up-to-date records
of land characteristics and ownership? If new technologies in property tax
assessment, collection, and record keeping do catch on, they could minimize
much of the current problem with the property tax in developing nations.
Factor 3: Alternative Revenue Sources
Will central governments release other productive revenue sources to local
governments? Examples are payroll taxes, piggyback personal income taxes
and excises, business taxes, and taxes on the use and ownership of motor
vehicles. To the extent these "easier" tax sources are available to local gov
ernments, the property tax might be minimized as a subnational govern
ment revenue source.
Property taxation is still full of potential, but also full of uncertainty,
as an instrument for bringing revenues and accountability to subnational
governments in developing and transitional countries.
Factor 4: Decentralization
Despite being one of the hottest development strategies in the past two de
cades, decentralization has hardly taken off (see table 3.4). Although there
are now many more decentralized and decentralizing developing countries
than in the past, the average expenditure share of subnational governments
in total government spending is considerably less than in developed coun
tries and has barely budged from its 15 percent level in the 1970s. However,

9 Dillinger

(1989) describes the successful practice in some Brazilian municipalities of using data pro
vided by other agencies to flag changes in the tax base.
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more elected officials are bringing pressure, there is a continuing reaction
against central governments that have become too controlling, and there is a
political strategy to promote bringing governments closer to people. All of
this could lead to increased decentralization. As decentralizing countries
turn to the job of identifying revenue sources for local governments, an
expanded property tax will be an obvious choice. Moreover, the increased
local government expenditure responsibility that comes with fiscal decen
tralization will give an increased incentive for undertaking difficult admin
istrative reforms.
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